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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BEN MILLER· and 
JOVALLE THOMAS, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. Case No. 18085 
LAWRENCE S. McMULLEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a tort action arising out of a semi-truck, 
automobile accident which occurred on the 10th day of November, 
1979., 4.1 miles West of Delta, in Millard County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried to a jury resulting in a special 
verdict favoring plaintiffs. The court entered judgment on the 
verdict on June 24, 1981, in favor of plaintiff, Ben Miller, in 
the amount of $67,650.00; and in favor of plaintiff, JoValle Thomas, 
in the amount of $73,750.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment on the verdict. 
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STATKMENT OF FACTS 
Anthony M. Thurber, plaintiffs' counsel, in his opening 
statement outlined the facts of the case. The collision was between 
a semi-truck driven in the eastbound lane by plaintiff, Ben Miller, 
and a Subaru station wagon driven in the westbound lane by defendant, 
Lawrence McMullen. The situs was a two-lane highway just West of 
Delta, Utah. As Mr. Miller approached the intersection, the Subaru 
signaled indicating a left turn. The Subaru turned into the east-
bound lane of traffic. Mr. Miller, in order to avoid the collision, 
first applied his brakes but thereafter released them and turned 
to the left. When the vehicles were approximately 50 feet apart 
Mr. McMullen, in the Subaru, suddenly turned to the right, returning 
to the westbound lane of traffic. The point of impact was in the 
westbound, or Subaru's, lane of traffic. R-36 to 39. 
Mr. Thurber characterized Mr. Miller as being the only 
real eye witness, or first hand eye witness to what had occurred. 
Mr. Thurber informed the jury that the impact of the Subaru collapsed 
the front bumper of the truck against the left front wheel, so that 
the truck had no steering control after the front wheel contacted 
the Subaru. 
Ray H. Ivie, defendant's counsel, in his opening statement, 
admitted that Lawrence McMullen could not remember anything that had 
happened after he left Delta, Utah. He contended that Tim Woodward, 
a passenger in the McMullen vehicle, would testify that the McMullen 
Subaru was going down the road at a normal speed, that the parties 
- 2 -
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had no intention of turning right or left, and all of a sudden 
he looked up and right in front of the windshield was the semi-
truck. He observed the driver of the Subaru crank it to the right. 
It was Mr. ·Ivie's contention that the physical facts would demon-
strate that the Subaru was parallel to the road on impact. He in-
formed the jury that there were two independent witnesses traveling 
in a car going in the same direction as the Subaru, and they did not 
observe the Subaru in the eastbound lane of traffic. Mr. Ivie in-
formed the jury that he did not believe that Mr. Miller's version 
of what happened could be substantiated by the physical evidence. 
Mr. Ivie informed the jury that he would call Newell Knight 
as an expert who would testify that in his opinion the absence of 
any fresh tire marks prior to impact indicated there was no sudden 
turning by either vehicle, the Subaru being absolutely parallel with 
the road at the point of impact at which time the semi-truck was at 
a 14° angle to the road striking the midpost of the Subaru. 
AS TO THE POLYGRAPH TEST: 
In chambers, immediately prior to trial, Mr. Thurber 
informed the court that he intended to introduce the results of a 
polygraph test taken by Mr. Miller. Mr. Ivie at that time informed 
the court that if there was a polygraph test, that he would not agree 
to the introduction of the results of such a test into evidence. The 
court, in chambers prior to trial, admonished Mr. Thurber not to 
mention the polygraph test in his opening statement. 
The first witness in the trial was plaintiff, Ben Miller. 
- 3 -
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On cross-examination by defense counsel, Ray H. Ivie, the examina-
tion was not proceeding in the manner that Mr. Miller approved of. 
The question was asked: R-111, lines 15-16. 
'~(By Mr~ Ivie) You said that you were inside of 
the intersection. Where inside of the intersection 
were you?" 
To which Mr. Miller gave the following answer: R-111, lines 17 to 19 
"Mr. Ivie, I know what you are trying to do, and 
I took a lie detector to verify what I'm testifying 
is the truth." 
Mr. Ivie called for a recess and made a motion for a mistrial. 
At the recess the following dialogue took place: 
R-112 line 9 to R-115 line 25 
"THE COURT: St t 1 tt a e your aw ma er. 
MR. IVIE: Yes, I ask for a mistrial at this time, 
because he volunteered that he had taken a lie detector test, and 
this is prejudicial. This matter was brought up by the Court, 
counsel, and there was not to be any mention of this until the 
Court ruled on it. I think it's prejudicial error. 
THE COURT: Well, for the record, it was brought up 
before we came out, and it had to do with the opening statements 
and I asked Mr. Thurber not to say anything about it in the opening 
statements until such time -- and not to say anything about it in 
the opening statement; that at an appropriate time we would decide 
whether or not that evidence was admissible. Now, if this is the 
time to decide whether that kind of evidence is admissible, fine. 
If it's not, then I'll rule upon your --
MR. IVIE: I think this is the time, because I asked for 
- 4 -
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a mistrial. I don't lay in the bushes until I've lost it. 
THE COURT: All right, that's fine. You've made a motion 
for a mistrial upon the grounds that that kind of evidence is not 
admissible· and, therefore, it would be prejudicial and to the extent 
that it could not be cured by any kind of instructions by the Court. 
jow, I'll hear, then, the positions with respect to the lie detector 
evidence which may be proffered. 
MR. THURBER: Well, your Honor, it's true that Mr. Miller 
did, before this lawsuit was ever started and at the insistence of 
Mr. Ivie's client, submit to a polygraph examination. 
THE COURT: Was it at their insistence? 
MR. THURBER: Yes. They refused to pay the property 
damage until it was --
THE COURT: And they had the lie detector test, then? 
MR. IVIE: I don't know about that. 
MR. THURBER: Well, they had insisted on it before they 
pay the property damage. 
THE COURT: But they insisted on you having it taken 
before they would negotiate with you, is that right? 
MR. THURBER: They wouldn't pay until they had. 
MR. IVIE: That may be State Farm in Salt Lake, I had 
nothing to do with that, and my client is a separate party. 
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Ivie, you are not representing to 
this court that you represent this man and not State Farm? 
MR. IVIE: Oh, no. I represent them, too. They are the 
.:>ame here. But I had no knowledge of this being taken." 
- 5 -
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"MR. IVIE: Okay. Who insisted on this in Salt Lake? 
MR. THURBER: Carolyn Jones? 
THE WITNESS: (Mr. Miller) Carolyn Jones wouldn't say 
anything about settling the property until we had a copy of the lie 
detector test. 
MR. IVIE: Have you got a copy you could furnish me? 
MR. THURBER: They have it. It should be in your file. 
MR. IVIE: Never seen anything, of this date. 
MR. THURBER: I'll be glad to get one for you. 
THE COURT: You have access to the file. 
MR. IVIE: Do you have a copy? 
MR. THURBER: I'm sure I do have in my file. I'd have 
to dig it out. 
THE COURT: Who did the test? 
MR. THURBER: A fellow named Steve Batley, who does the 
examination for the Salt Lake Police Department. 
THE COURT: And the test was clean, not deceptive? 
MR. THURBER: That's right. 
THE COURT: And the only reason it was taken is because 
the plaintiff in this case insisted upon that, when I say "the 
plaintiff" I mean the insurance carrier for the plaintiff, insisted 
that it be taken before negotiations would be had with regard to the 
matter, is that so? 
MR. THURBER: The insurance carrier for the defendant 
McMullen. The only reason we had him submit to it. 
- 6 -
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THE COURT: I don't know. I'm going to take this matter 
under advisement, but I'm going to go on with the trial. 
MR. IVIE : Okay. 
THE COURT: And I will receive evidence with regard to it, 
to the results of the test. 
MR. IVIE: Based upon their representation? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. IVIE: Okay. You are positive of that, now, you are 
not taking his word on something? 
MR. THURBER: No. I was in on it. 
THE WITNESS: (Mr. Miller) He was the one that told 
me I was going to take the polygraph test; not me. I hired him 
to do the legal work." 
Carolyn Jones, of State Farm, who was the person handling 
the claim in question, testified that Ben Miller had suggested to 
~er that he would take a lie detector test and furnish a copy to 
her. R-268 to R-277. 
stated: 
Mr. Miller, when he was specifically asked about the test, 
" ... It was you, (Mr. Thurber) , thought that I should 
take it (lie detector test) and we should have it on 
record for you ... I told her (Carolyn Jones) what I was 
doing. And I said, 'We'd be most happy to give you a 
copy of it'." R-277 
And on cross examination of Mr. Miller in regards to the test, 
Mr. Ivie asked: R-280 line 20 to 22. 
"Then it was at your suggestion that you had the 
polygraph test taken, not at the request of anyone 
from State Farm?" 
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And to that Mr. Miller replied: R-280 lines 23 to 25 
"I never did say that it was requested. I told her 
that my attorney suggested that I take one, and she 
says, 'I would like to have a copy of it'. Now, 
that's the way 
A.nd then Mr. Ivie asked: R-280 lines 26-27 
"Soi.twas at your attorney's suggestion that you 
took it?" 
To ~~ich Mr. Miller replied: R-280, lines 28 to 30 
"No. No. It was my attorney's suggestion that I 
took it; but when I told her about we were going 
to take it she said, 'I would like to have a copy 
of it'." 
After Mr. Miller and Carolyn Jones had testified, Mr. Ivie stated 
to the court: R-281, lines 25 to 30 and R-282 lines 1 to 3 
"Apparently, when you come down to the truth of 
the matter, Tony thought it would be a good idea 
to have Ben take a polygraph test, he took one 
and furnished it to Carolyn Jones. So far as the 
test is concerned, it's simply self-serving. If 
it's favorable, he gives it to her. If it's un-
favorable, not. Now here's this man (Lawrence 
McMullen) with this, and he's got a big stake in 
this case here, his lips are sealed because he 
has no memory of this. And to allow a -- he can't 
testify as to what happened." 
Mr. Thurber then stated his position to the court: R-282 lines 
9 to 12 
"Well my position is simply this, your Honor: Mr. 
Ivie's entire thrust here is that Mr. Miller is 
lying, just bald-face lying about this thing, and 
it's the best kind of evidence we can have." 
The court then stated: R-282 lines 13 to 15 
"On the issue, Mr. Ivie, of whether or not this man 
is telling the truth, what better evidence is there 
available to anybody than a polygraph test?" 
The court made its ruling. R-283 line 20 to R-284 line 16 
- 8 -
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"Okay. I'm going to deny the mistrial. I think it's 
only fair that the Court announce that decision at 
this time, and that gives the parties a right to or 
the opportunity to take whatever action they want to 
take, knowing what the result will be. And I do it on 
the basis that where the purport of cross examination 
of the plaintiff by the defendant is the assertion that 
the plaintiff has lied on direct examination with respect 
to the specifics as to how the accident occurred, it is 
not grounds for a mistrial that the plaintiff spontan-
eously blurts out that he has previously taken a poly-
graph test with respect to those specific matters and 
that he passed the test, if in fact it is true and if 
the examiner or if -- strike that -- and if the test 
results are available and proffered. I think under the 
circumstances and the circumstances, further, of this 
case it would be error to refuse to allow the evidence 
and the examiner's testimony, if it were offered. How-
ever, I will not, and this may be error also, but I 
believe that the state of the art with respect to poly-
graph examinations is not such that even under the circum-
stances of this case I could admit the results of the test 
without foundation. Now that's where you are. So don't 
try to get the test result in before the Jury unless 
you are prepared to bring the examiner, and we'll not 
talk about the polygraph test on either side unless 
the evidE~nce comes in to the Jury concerning it, unless 
I admit evidence concerning it. Okay?" 
After the admonition of the court, as above set forth, 
testimo·ny was taken of the first rebuttal witness, as follows: 
R-472 line 24 to R-474 line 4 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. THURBER: 
Q What is your occupation -- I'm sorry. Give us your name 
first. 
A My name's Steven Taylor. 
Q It's not Thomas. 
A No, not Thomas. 
Q Where do you reside, Mr. Taylor? 
A In Salt Lake City. 
- 9 -
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Q What is your occupation or profession? 
A I'm a polygraph examiner. 
Q And will you tell us what that is? 
A A polygraph is a lie detector. I administer lie detection 
tests for various businesses, both private and public businesses. 
Q Now, what education and practical experience have you had 
in that field? 
A In that field, in my background in education as a bachelors 
degree at Utah State University and graduate work in exercise physioloi 
MR. IVIE: No sir ---
' 
THE COURT: Now just a minute. Approach the bench, please. 
(Off the record.) 
THE COURT: We are going to take a short recess, Ladies 
and Gentlemen. A law question has arisen, I want to discuss this 
matter with counsel in chambers. And I'll ask them to come in. 
(WHEREUPON, the Court and Counsel removed from the court-
room, where discussion was had off the record, and reconvened in open 
court upon return to the courtroom at 1:26 o'clock p.m.) 
THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen, the Court has concluded 
that as a law matter that, and after discussing with counsel what 
the purpose of this testimony might be, that it is precluded by the 
Rules of Civil Procedure; and, therefore, the Court declines, Mr. 
Thurber, to permit the proffered testimony to approach the Jury. 
MR. THURBER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you may step down. 
- 10 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. THURBER: Thank you for corning." 
Mr. Thurber then continued: R-474 line 5 to 12 
"Your Honor, my next witness would be another certified 
polygraph 9perator, Steve Bartlett, who is out of the State and 
not available. 
In view of his absence, we'll call another rebuttal 
witness. We'll call Ben Miller. 
THE COURT: All right. Now Counsel approach the bench. 
(Off the record.) 
Mr. Thurber then continued his rebuttal. R-474 line 13 to 26 
FURTHER DIRECT EXAf1INATION 
BY MR. THURBER: 
Q Mr. Miller, now you were present during Major Knight's 
testimony yesterday and today, were you not? 
A 
Q 
Yes , sir. 
And you saw his reconstruction of the attitudes, according 
to his view of the two vehicles, at the time they came in contact, 
did you not? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q 
A 
Is that the way it was? 
No, sir. No way. 
Q Have you ever lied or will you ever lie to anyone about 
what happened as relates to this accident? 
A No, sir." 
The counsel, at the bench above referred to, disclosed 
the fact that Mr. Steven Taylor had performed a polygraph test on 
- 11 -
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Ben Miller some time after the trial commenced and before his 
testimony was offered. 
AS TO THE COURTtS JURY INSTRUCTION: 
The court gave Jury Instruction No. 10, over defendant's 
objection, to-wit: R-471 lines 6 to 12. 
"Defendant objects to the giving of Instruction 
No. 10 for the reason that the Court has informed 
the Jury of the effect of their verdict sof ar as 
the comparative negligence law is concerned. And 
although McGinn v. Utah Power case is a case that 
arises out of Idaho, I still think that is the law 
of the State of Utah. So for that reason I object 
to it." 




THE COURT COMM:ITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT McMULLEN'S 
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL WHEN PLAINTIFF, BEN MILLER, AS THE FIRST 
WITNESS·, TESTIFIED THAT HE HAD TAKEN A LIE DETECTOR TEST THAT VERIFIED 
WHAT HE WAS TESTIFYING TO WAS THE TRUTH. 
The court committed error in failing to grant defendant 
McMullen's motion for a mistrial when plaintiff, Ben Miller, as the 
first witness, testified that he had taken a lie detector test that 
verified what he was testifying ·to was the truth. 
A 1980 Utah criminal case established the following rule 
on the admission of polygraph examinations: 
"Polygraph examinations may be admitted under binding 
stipulation between parties, but even if there is 
stipulation, admissibility must be premised upon proof 
that examiner was qualified and that examination was 
- 12 -
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conducted according to accepted principles, and 
it does not necessarily follow that licensure of 
examiner will by itself be sufficient to establish 
examiner's qualifications." State of Utah v. Collins, 
612 P.2d 775. 
!he Court in the Collins case, supra, reviewed the develop-
ment of the use of the polygraph and noted that there are some recent 
decisions admitting polygraph examinations at least under certain 
conditions. The Court further noted the vast majority of courts 
which have ruled on the issue, as to the admissibility of polygraph 
tests, have held unstipulated polygraph examinations inadmissible. 
The Court stated: 
" ... it is impossible to address the issue of the 
admissibility of polygraph results without an 
adequate evidentiary record, including expert tes-
timony which deals with such factors as the validity 
of the underlying theory upon which polygraph exam-
inations are based, the practical application of 
those principles to the issue of detection of fabri-
cation, the verifiability of polygraph test, and the 
problem whether successful deception of the polygraph 
can be accomplished." State vs Collins, supra, at 778. 
A 1979 Utah case, State of Utah vs. Abel, 600 P.2d 994, 
addressing itself to whether a stipulation was necessary as a 
foundation for admissibility of the polygraph test stated: 
" ... a stipulation does not in any way establish the 
reliability or accuracy of polygraph test results. 
However, it does embody an important notion of fair-
ness for those parties who consider the polygraph 
reliable and are willing to rely on it. A stipulation 
forecloses one party from preventing admission of an 
adverse test after he and the opposing party have agreed 
it would be admissible, simply because he does not like 
the results. In addition, a stipulation allows each 
of the parties to insist that the polygraph be adminis-
tered by reputable, qualified persons, in a manner most 
conducive to producing accurate results, and in a manner 
that can be monitored." 
- 13 -
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In the Abel case, supra, speaking of the accuracy of 
the polygraph, the Court stated: 
"This Court has heretofore observed that even its 
most sanguine proponents admit that it cannot be 
relied on to determine with absolute and invariable 
assurance whether a person is lying or telling the 
truth. State vs. Jenkins, Utah, 523 P.2d 1232(1974)" 
The Abel case, supra, stands for the proposition that the 
stipulation to introduce the polygraph results into evidence, must 
be binding on both sides. In the Abel case, supra, the defendant 
had signed the stipulation, but the counsel for the State of Utah 
had not signed the stipulation. The Court said there is no stip-
ulation because only the defendant is bound by the agreement and held 
that the Court by allowing the test results into evidence had 
committed error. 
In the case at bar, now being considered by the Court, 
there is no claim that there was a stipulation for the admission 
of the polygraph test results. There was the erroneous representa-
tion that the defendant's insurance company representative had 
requested such a test but the plaintiff, Ben Miller, specifically 
testified that was not so. R-277 and R-280 lines 20 to 30. 
If the rule for the admission of polygraph test results 
is that there must be a binding stipulation, a foundation by the 
operator as to his qualifications, and a showing that the test was 
conducted according to accepted principles; it would then seem 
logical that the alleged results of the test could not be introduced 
by the statement of a witness that he had taken a test and the 
evidence that he was giving was truthful. 
14 ·-
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The California District Court of Appeal, Second District, 
in PE~ople vs. Aragon, 316 P.2d 370, in analyzing a case similar to 
the one at bar, stated: 
'.'In the instant case there is nothing before us to 
establish what kind of lie detector test was given, 
if any; there is nothing concerning the accuracy of 
such a test; there is no showing that the tests, even 
if properly given, have achieved scientific recogni-
tion in this state; there is no foundation for the 
admission of any test results; and there is no stipula-
tion that the testimony could be received in evidence. 
It is not at all unlikely that a popular belief has 
been formed from press, radio, television, stage and 
screen that the lie detector is an accomplishment of 
modern science the results of which are as reliable 
as those of fingerprinting, blood tests and ballistics. 
However this is not correct. It is general knowledge 
among those familiar with the lie detector machines 
that the results are greatly dependent upon the train-
ing, experience and skill of the operators and that 
the results vary with different types of subjects . 
. .. Appellate court reports throughout the country 
would indicate an agreement that the best lie detector 
test to date is a thorough painstaking and searching 
cross-examination by competent counsel. 
If the result of the lie detector test is inadmis-
sible in the first instance, surely no one would contend 
that the results can be cloaked in the raiment of an 
accusatory statement and then slipped into evidence. If 
we were to hold that such a course is proper we would 
have sanctioned the receipt of damaging evidence which, 
but for such masking, could not be heard by the jury. 
We believe that the prosecution should not be permitted 
to introduce into evidence by indirection what wduld be 
highly improper if done directly. Our system of juris-
prudence is not constructed upon such a foundation. More-
over, it would be hard to believe that the jury here con-
sidered the statements solely as accusatory statements. 
Obviously the statements with reference to the lie 
detector test as introduced in this case were highly 
prejudicial and in our opinion constituted prejudicial 
error.'' 
The calling of the first rebuttal witness, a Steven Taylor, 
who purportedly had conducted a polygraph test on Ben Miller after 
the connnencernent of the trial at bar; the statement by Mr. Thurber 
- 15 -
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that the next witness would be another certified polygraph operator, 
Steve Bartlett, who was out of the state and not available; and the 
recalling of Ben Miller to state again that he had not lied to any-
one about what happened as it related to the accident; constituted 
further prejudicial error. 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted Rules of Evidence, February 
I 
17, 1971, which were effective July 1, 1971. Rule 2, provides as 
follows: 
"Except to the extent to which they may be relaxed 
by other procedural rule or statute applicable 
to the specific situation, these rules shall apply 
in every proceeding, both criminal and civil, con-
ducted by or under the supervision of a court, in 
which evidence is produced." 
Defendant in the case before the bar contends in civil 
matters there is no procedural rule or statute applicable to the 
specific situation of the admissibility of the results of the lie 
detector test that should make the rule different in civil and 
in criminal cases. 
Other Courts have dealt with the matter of lie detector 
tests in civil cases. 
rule: 
The California Court in 1957 laid down the hard and fast 
"Lie detector tests have no place in California law." 
Gideon vs. Gideon, 314 P.2d 1011. 
The Montana Court in 1972, stated: 
" ... Few jurisdictions allow the polygraph tests in 
criminal actions. An extensive research reveals 
fewer jurisdictions have considered such evidence 
in civil actions. After hearing the evidence offered 
by the polygraph expert at the trial, the court 
properly excluded his testimony." 
Gropp vs. Lotton, 503 P.2d 661, at 666. 
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The New Mexico Court in 1966, stated: 
"That Legislature by statute saw fit to license 
and regulate polygraphy did not raise profession 
or occupation to such scientific dignity as would 
justify Supreme Court's recognition of results of 
polygraph tests as admissible evidence." 
In re Moyer, 421 P.2d 781. 
However, by 1976, the New Mexico Court had modified 
its rule in civil cases to the point where the Court stated: 
"present standard for admissibility of polygraph 
evidence takes into consideration qualifications 
of polygraph operator, reliability of procedure 
used, validity of test made, and other evidentiary 
requirements." Hammond vs. Reeves, 552 P.2d 1237, 
at 1238. 
All of the Courts seem to require that before polygraph 
test results will be admissible in evidence, a foundation must be 
laid that the examiner is qualified and the examination was con-
ducted according to accepted principles. The case at bar falls 
short of even the very minimum standard. 
In the interest of uniformity it would seem that both 
in civil and in criminal matters, under the Rules of Evidence for 
Utah and the Collins case, supra, a further prerequisite should 
require stipulation between the parties. 
POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS TO WHAT EFFECT 
THEIR ANSWERS WOULD HAVE ON THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE CASE. 
The court committed error in instructing the Jury as to 
what effect their answers would have on the final outcome of the case. 
Over the objection of defendant's counsel, the court instruct 
the Jury as follows in Instruction No. 10. 
- 17 -
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"In considering your answer to Question No. f, 
the Court cautions you that the amounts you arrive 
at are not necessarily the amounts plaintiff Ben 
Miller will be awarded as a judgment against the 
defendant. The Court may be required to make certain 
adjustments to your findings by reason of the compara-
tive negligence law of this State. 
Under that law plaintiff Ben Miller will not ulti-
mately be awarded judgment for any amount, regardless 
of your answers, if you find his negligence equal to 
or greater than that of the defendant. On the other 
hand, if you find the defendant's negligence greater 
than plaintiff Miller's negligence, then plaintiff 
Miller will ultimately be awarded a judgment, but in 
awarding judgment to him the Court will reduce your 
figures in answer to Question No. 4 by the percentage 
of negligence which you have attributed to him if any, 
in your answer to Question No. 3. 
With respect to plaintiff Jovalle Thomas, the Court 
will ultimately award judgment to her against the 
defendant for the full amount stated in your answer 
to Question No. 5, without reduction, as she is not 
affected by the comparative negligence law." 
In Comparative Negligence Manuel, by Carroll R. Heft, J.D .. 
and C. James Heft, J.D., published by Callaghan &-Company, 1971, it 
states: 
"The special verdict is the very cornerstone of the 
comparative negligence concept, and the jury does not, 
and should not, know the legal effect and result of 
its answers to the interrogatoreis in the special ver-
dict. By using the procedure of a special verdict under 
comparative negligence, a jury finds the facts without 
regard to the ultimate outcome of the case. The court 
takes the facts as found by the jury and awards judgment. 
The procedure is intended to ascertain the truth un-
tainted by prejudice or a desire to see one of the parties 
win or lose." (Chapter 8, page 1.) 
In 1974, the Utah Supreme Court, in the case of McGinn 
vs. Utah Power & Light Company, 529 P.2d 423, ruling upon a compara-
tive negligence case that arose under the laws of the State of Idaho 
construing Idaho law, held that the jury should not be informed as 
to the effect of their verdict on the final outcome of the case . 
. ~ -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Judge Henroid, speaking for the Utah Court, stated: 
"The general rule is that it is reversible error 
for the trial court to instruct the jury as to what 
effect their answers will have on the final outcome 
of the case." 
While Utah law was not in issue, Judge Henroid said the Court 
chose to subscribe to the rule as above announced. 
Counsel for defense urges that the above is a good and 
proper rule and should be the law 0f this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The results of polygraph examinations may be admitted 
under binding stipulation between the parties, but even if there 
is stipulation, admissibility must be premised upon proof that the 
examiner was qualified and that the examination was conducted accord 
ing to accepted principles. 
The court committed prejudicial error in the case at bar 
in failing to grant defendant McMullen's motion for a mistrial when 
plaintiff, Ben Miller, as the first witness, testified that he had 
taken a lie detector test that verified what he was testifying to 
was the truth. 
Plaintiff's counsel laid a foundation for the court's 
prejudicial error when he made the erroneous representation that 
the defendant's insurance company representative had requested the 
polygraph test. 
The prejudicial error was further compounded by the state-
ment of Mr. Thurber that the next witness would be another certified 
polygraph operator, Steve Bartlett, who was out of the state and not 
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available; and the recalling of Ben Miller to state again that 
he had not lied to anyone about what happened as it related to 
the accident. 
The court committed prejudicial error in instructing 
the jury as to what effect their answers to the special verdict 
would have on the final outcome of the case. 
d 
Respectfully submitted this /cf' day of February, 1982. 
RAY H. 1 Attorney endant-Appellant 
48 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
to Anthony M. Thurber, Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents, 211 East 
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